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When Secular Universalism Meets Pluralism:
Religious Schools and the Politics of School-Based
Management in Hong Kong
Junxi Qian* and Lily Kongy
*Department of Geography, The University of Hong Kong
ySchool of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University
This article examines the politics of school-based management (SBM) in Hong Kong, with a specific focus on
the conflicts between the state and three Christian churches (Catholic, Anglican, and Methodist) running
state-funded religious schools. Although the state based its advocacy for SBM on neoliberally driven ideas of
participation, transparency, and accountability, religious groups expressed worry about the loss of control over
schools as an institution of value transmission anchored in religious beliefs. This article uses the SBM contro-
versy as a case study to advance geographical debates on religious schools and argues that neoliberalism forms a
necessary lens through which to examine the state–religion relations concerning religious schools. It offers an
analytical framework that emphasizes the mutually constitutive relationship between religious schools and state
building. It lends evidence to this argument by situating religious schools in the context of neoliberalization of
education policies and arguing that faith-based sensibilities create new vectors of resistance to neoliberalism as
a distinctive secular formation. The empirical analyses address three questions. First, we develop a detailed
analysis of the discourses and rationalities upheld by the Hong Kong government and the churches. Second, we
consider interactions and exchanges between the state and the churches, focusing on the assertions, negotia-
tions, and concessions that both needed to make in a prolonged struggle over the decision-making process.
Third, we reflect briefly on the aftermath of the passing of SBM to situate the churches’ concerns in a broader
context of neoliberal education policy. Key Words: contingent neoliberalism, education, Hong Kong, religious
school, school-based management.
本文检视香港以校为本的管理 (SBM) 政治, 并特别聚焦政府和经营受政府资助的宗教学校之三大基督教
会 (天主教、英国国教与循道卫理联合教会) 之间的冲突。尽管政府对 SBM 的倡议是根据新自由主义所
驱动的参与、透明和可咎责性之概念,宗教团体却担忧失去学校作为传达根据宗教信仰的价值之机构。本
文运用 SBM 的冲突作为案例研究, 推进地理学有关宗教学校的辩论, 并主张新自由主义是检视宗教学校
中的政府—宗教关系的必要视角。本文提供的分析架构,强调宗教学校与国家建构之间的共构关系。本文
将宗教学校置放于教育政策的新自由主义化脉络中,并主张以信仰为基础的感性创造出对抗作为特殊的世
俗形式之新自由主义的崭新动力,藉此证明上述主张。本文的经验分析处理以下三大问题:首先,我们对香
港政府和教会所拥护的论述与合理性进行细緻的分析。再者, 我们考量政府和教会之间的互动与交换, 并
聚焦对决策过程的长期抗争而言同时必须的坚持、协商与让步。第三, 我们简要地反思 SBM 通过后的境
况, 从而将教会的考量置放在新自由主义教育政策的广泛脉络中。 关键词：偶然的新自由主义,教育,香
港,宗教学校,以校为本的管理。
Este artıculo examina la polıtica de direccion basada en la escuela (SBM) en Hong Kong, con un interes
especıfico en los conflictos que se presentan entre el estado y tres iglesias cristianas (la catolica, la anglicana y
la metodista) que regentan tres escuelas religiosas financiadas por el estado. Aunque el estado basaba su defensa
del SBM en ideas de participacion, transparencia y responsabilidad de tinte neoliberal, los grupos religiosos
expresaban su preocupacion sobre la perdida del control sobre las escuelas equiparando tal control a una
institucion para la trasmision de valores anclados en creencias religiosas. Este artıculo usa la controversia de la
SBM como un estudio de caso con el cual promover debates geograficos sobre las escuelas religiosas, y argu-
menta que el neoliberalismo forma una lente necesaria a traves de la cual examinar las relaciones del estado
con la religion, en lo que concierne a las escuelas religiosas. El artıculo ofrece un marco analıtico que enfatiza
la relacion mutuamente constitutiva entre las escuelas religiosas y la construccion de estado. Se proporciona
evidencia a favor de este argumento situando las escuelas religiosas en el contexto de la neoliberalizacion de las
polıticas educativas y arguyendo que las sensibilidades basadas en la fe crean nuevos vectores de resistencia al
neoliberalismo como una formacion secular distintiva. Los analisis empıricos abocan tres cuestiones. Primero,
desarrollamos un detallado analisis de los discursos y racionalidades enarbolados por el gobierno de Hong Kong
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y las iglesias. Segundo, consideramos las interacciones e intercambios entre el estado y las iglesias, concen-
trandonos en las aseveraciones, negociaciones y concesiones que ambos necesitaron para sostener una lucha
prolongada sobre el proceso de la toma de decisiones. Tercero, reflexionamos brevemente sobre las repercu-
siones de la defuncion de la SBM para situar las preocupaciones de las iglesias en un contexto mas amplio de la
polıtica neoliberal sobre educacion. Palabras clave: neoliberalismo contingente, educacion, Hong Kong, escuela reli-
giosa, direccion basada en la escuela.
O
n8 July 2004, the Legislative Council of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR) approved an amendment of the
region’s Education Ordinance, which obliged all
“aided schools” in Hong Kong—schools run by non-
governmental school sponsoring bodies (SSBs) but
fully funded by the government—to establish an
incorporated management committee (IMC). The
IMC, a central component of the school-based man-
agement (SBM) initiative keenly promoted by the
then Education and Manpower Bureau (EMB),1 was
designated as the supervisory body of a school’s day-to-
day operation and held accountable directly to EMB.
Under the Amendment, the SSB, which previously
had full control of schools by appointing all members
in a School Management Committee (SMC), could
appoint only up to 60 percent of the members in an
IMC. The rest consisted of elected representatives of
teachers, parents, alumni, and independents. The bill
triggered considerable concern, even resentment,
among faith-based SSBs, namely, three of Hong
Kong’s mainline churches: Catholic, Anglican, and
Methodist. They expressed worry that the inclusion of
non-SSB elements in school management would limit
their ability to operate religious schools according to
faith-based directions and missions. Beneath the anxi-
ety over the loss of control was also the fear that the
IMC, under the government’s jurisdiction, might be
exploited by pro-Beijing politicians as a channel of
ideological infiltration.
In Hong Kong, primary and secondary schools are
made up of three groups: public schools, SSB schools,
and private or international schools. The first two are
fully funded by the government. Before the introduc-
tion of SBM, the government did not intervene in the
day-to-day operations of SSB schools. In 2015, public
schools and SSB schools accounted for 79 percent of
primary and 73 percent of secondary schools (Census
and Statistics Department HKSAR 2015). Although
the official statistics do not specify the numbers of
each type of SSB schools, suffice it to say that in 2004,
when the controversy erupted, more than 300 SSBs
were involved in the provision of primary and second-
ary education.
Faith-based education, most of which was provided
by Christian churches, predated the free provision of
compulsory state education in Hong Kong, which was
introduced as late as 1971. The Catholic Church has
long been the largest SSB in Hong Kong. The Catho-
lic, Anglican, and Methodist churches together oper-
ated 40 percent of all primary and secondary schools
in 2004. Given this, the debate between the state and
the churches over SBM profoundly reshaped state–
religion relations.2 The proposal of SBM was in gen-
eral met with support from secular sponsoring bodies;
associations of teachers and parents even openly
praised the diversification of management committees.
Progovernment religious organizations running Bud-
dhist and Taoist schools showed compliance, at least.
Therefore, the controversy between Chrisitian
churches and the state is best analyzed as an irrecon-
ciled secular–religious tension, when the churches
tried to fend off a specific expression of secular univer-
salism. By secular universalism, we refer to the prioriti-
zation of market-based rational logics over other
values, including religious ones. It is borne out of a
broader neoliberal transition central to the education
reforms in Hong Kong (Choi 2005), which affected
not only religious schools but arguably the entire edu-
cation system. Eventually, the introduction of SBM to
religious schools escalated to a bitter polemic, as differ-
ent actors—the government, the judiciary, and faith
actors—all constructed their political claims by engag-
ing with or reworking these secular universalist
discourses.
The controversy, to begin with, was situated in the
broader context of state–religion relations in Hong
Kong. In postcolonial Hong Kong, traditional Chinese
religions (Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism) and
Christian denominations have all established partner-
ship with the state in terms of welfare provision and
the building of communities; politically, however,
Christian groups, having lost the privileges they enjoy
in the colonial period (1841–1997), are alienated from
the incumbent state (Kwong 2002). Due to the postco-
lonial threat to Christian churches’ social prestige and
the fear of losing religious freedom under Chinese rule,
Chritistian churches have constituted a major force in
2 Qian and Kong
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the struggle for democratization in post-1997 Hong
Kong (Kwok 2015). The controversy over SBM also
articulated with the worry shared by the general public
that the HKSAR government acted as a spokesperson
and representative of the Chinese central state, whose
goal was ultimately political assimilation. Debates sur-
rounding SBM were entangled with other contentions
and struggles. These included the proposed legislation
based on Article 23 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong,
which was hotly contested just a year before the SBM
issue erupted, as opponents believed that it was a way
of enabling the suppression of anti-Beijing dissidents in
the name of protecting “state security.” Another exam-
ple was a controversy set in motion in 2010 and ended
in 2012 with the state’s compromise, when the Educa-
tion Bureau sought to introduce Moral and National
Education as a compulsory part of the curriculum,
which was viewed with suspicion and dubbed by detrac-
tors as “brainwashing education.”3
The second context of the controversy was the neo-
liberalization of education in Hong Kong, which this
article frames as a distinctive secular formulation.
Recent education reforms in Hong Kong have echoed
the global trends emphasizing market standards, effi-
ciency, quality, and accountability. These reforms
devolve some decision-making powers to schools but
also entail the recentralization of state power by means
of a nomenclature of monitoring and assessment. Fear
of the loss of school autonomy is not confined to reli-
gious schools but shared by other state-funded schools,
as this study reveals later.
This article examines the politics of SBM in Hong
Kong by engaging with but also advancing the litera-
ture on geographies of religious schools. Religious
schools have long been the center of impassioned
debates, both within and outside academia, and the
contentions have been identified as those between the
secular and the religious, the universal and the particu-
lar (Jackson 2003; McKinney 2006). Although the vast
literatures in education studies and political theories
tend to treat religious schools as passive objects of state
policies and political discourses (Burtonwood 2003;
Dagovitz 2004; Gardner, Cairns, and Lawton 2005),
recent works in sociology and geography have instead
analyzed religious schools as performative constructions
that enliven institutional and political identities by
responding to state secularism in proactive, often resis-
tant ways (Kong 2005; Bano 2011; Hemming 2011a,
2011c; Dwyer and Parutis 2013). In particular, geogra-
phers have shown a growing interest—with case studies
mainly drawn from the United Kingdom—in addressing
religious schools as coconstituted by religious orienta-
tions and state constructions of community, citizenship,
and national identity (Hemming 2011a, 2011c; Dwyer
and Parutis 2013). These studies imply that faith actors
are not a monolithic category but active in engaging
with and reworking state secular discourses. This article
builds on debates surrounding these agendas and poli-
tics and aims to advance a fuller theorization of reli-
gious schools as a contingent, ongoing, and hybrid site
of negotiation and contestation. Instead of relying
solely on the ideological and discursive construction of
religious schools, this article develops a situated, proces-
sual analysis of a prolonged contention involving overt
struggle and resistance.
Overall, this article aims to contribute to the grow-
ing literature on religious schools in two ways. First,
although extant literatures in sociology, political phi-
losophy, and political science have reiterated the ten-
sions between state secularism and faith actors’ claims
for distinct identities, they tend to reify religious
schools as an ideal type, with fixed attributes, standing
as a constitutive outside to the secularism of the
broader society. The lack of sensitivity to situated
dynamics places these analyses in an either–or stale-
mate, with some scholars arguing for the legitimacy of
religious schools and others arguing the opposite. In
realpolitik, however, faith actors and the state are
caught in competing, yet mutually constitutive situa-
tions. Religious schools, as a geohistorically embedded
social institution where complex rationales and claims
come into mutual play, defy clear-cut boundaries
between secularism and religiosity. If we approach the
secular–religious tension as a process, not a given sta-
tus quo, it becomes clear that state projects and faith
actors coevolve as they respond to and negotiate with
one another. This article delineates an analytical
framework that attends closely to the performative
construction of religious and secular values and identi-
ties amidst compliance, negotiation, or resistance.
Following Dwyer and Meyer (1995), this article is
interested in not only the ideological construction of
religious schools but also political decision-making pro-
cesses that are notoriously uncertain in local contexts
and involve a labyrinth of negotiations and exchanges.
Second, although the tension between religious
schools and secular discourses is central to the geo-
graphical literature on faith-based education, there is a
curious paucity of research that explores the relation-
ship between religious schools and the neoliberal
restructuring of state authority, which is, arguably, the
single most important context of contemporary public
When Secular Universalism Meets Pluralism 3
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policies in many developed capitalist societies. This
article argues that neoliberalism provides a particularly
relevant context for understanding tensions and accom-
modations between religious schools and state author-
ity, because neoliberalization, in its twenty-first-century
forms, entails the active reconstruction of state appara-
tus and recentralization of state power (Peck 2001;
Peck and Tickell 2002). To bring neoliberalism into
the picture, on the one hand, allows us to analyze neo-
liberalism as contingent, processural, geohistorically
specific, and in dialectic relationship with local claims,
traditions, and institutions (Springer 2010). In this
vein, this article joins other analyses that have recog-
nized that neoliberalism is negotiated and coevolves
with situated conditions (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore
2010; Peck 2010; Springer 2010). On the other hand, a
growing literature in geography demonstrates how neo-
liberal policies of education have gained great momen-
tum in advanced capitalist societies (Mitchell 2003;
Klaf and Kwan 2010). Studies on charter schools in the
United States, for example, illustrate how privately run
but publicly funded schools are particularly susceptible
to a neoliberal mandate of market efficiency and
accountability (Hankins and Martin 2006; Mitchell
and Sparke 2016). Although sophisticated analysis has
been applied to the desire of state and private actors to
enlist and create “resilient” subjects responsive to mar-
ket logics (Mitchell 2003; Mitchell and Sparke 2016),
the studies tend to view neoliberalism as an over-
whelming project that produces uncontested policy
results. Less work, however, has been done to analyze
how neoliberalization of education is unevenly consti-
tuted. This article argues that faiths effectuate new vec-
tors of resistance to neoliberal education policies. Akin
to other kinds of faith-based organizations, religious
schools live in multiplex relationships with neoliberal-
ism, accepting certain neoliberal ethos but simulta-
neously contesting it on the basis of religious ethics and
identities (Williams, Cloke, and Thomas 2012).
The controvery over SBM offers a particularly fraught
case because of the explicit tensions between religious
automony and state control in Hong Kong. Hong Kong,
after all, is increasingly characterized by a culture of civic
disobedience and widespread distrust of the incumbent
state, instituted after the 1997 Handover (Ma 2007).
Instead of provoking an overt antimarket agenda, neoli-
beralization of education inHong Kong stoked the prode-
mocracy sentiments of Hong Kong citizens, especially
faith actors, who in turn urged the state to recognize alter-
native positionalities to the neoliberal mantras of stand-
ards, competitiveness, and efficiency.
Theorizing the Politics of Religious
Schools: The Entanglement of State,
Religion, and Education
Religious Schools in the Geographies of Religion and
Education
Debates on religious schools have proliferated in
recent years, against a backdrop of increased involvement
of religious organizations in the provision of formal educa-
tion. State-funded religious schools are particularly con-
tentious, because the generosity of state funding often
implies the conformity to a secular modernity (Dwyer
1993). Academics and policymakers criticizing religious
schools base their arguments on varigated versions of lib-
eral secularism and universalism: (1) Religious schools
lead to the segregation of religious adherents from the cul-
tures and values of mainstream society (Flint 2007; Breen
2009); (2) religious schools encroach on free choice and
individual autonomy, because religion acts as a superior
source of authority in terms of ideologies and worldviews
(Jackson 2003; Dagovitz 2004; Hemming 2011c); (3)
there is a danger of religious schools radicalizing members
of religious groups and breeding a sense of enmity toward
the state and other sections of society (Short 2002; Merry
2015).
In parallel, those arguing in favor of religious
schools also turn to liberal democratic lexicons to but-
tress their positions. Four major arguments have been
advocated: (1) Religious schools are not necessarily
ignorant of the ethos and values of a broader society,
nor are they simply vehicles for nurturing particular-
ism (Flint 2007; Breen 2009); (2) personal autonomy
is not absolute but exercised within cultural contexts
(Burtonwood 2003); religious schools create autono-
mous individuals by facilitating “social interactions
and networks that supply meaning, membership, soli-
darity and purpose” (Merry 2015, 142); (3) political
liberalism includes a defense of pluralism; therefore,
respect for views and values of religious communities
should be deemed a desirable virtue (Dagovitz 2004;
Hemming 2011c); (4) religious schools must be cele-
brated, for they offer an institution in which religious
ethos can be defended, and communal identity can
flourish and be protected (Valins 2003; Flint 2007).
The arguments just reviewed provide an informed
point of departure to understand the origins of conten-
tions around religious schools. Yet, as we suggested
earlier, it is somewhat futile to reify religious schools
as an either–or choice between rejection and recogni-
tion, in tandem with abstract political logics. An
4 Qian and Kong
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either–or heuristic reifies the epistemological separa-
tion between religious schools and the secular state, at
the expense of a scrutiny of ambivalence, interaction,
and mutual constitution. Instead, a situated approach
allows an understanding of relationships between state
secularism and religious schools as negotiated, fric-
tional, and ongoing. Religious schools are not external
to secular discourses of the state but constitutive of
and constituted by state building. This coconstitution
is characterized by “contingent, often contradictory,
assemblages and alliances,” but it is also “prone to sub-
version in various sites and spaces” (Williams, Cloke,
and Thomas 2012, 1484). It is by acting on each other,
and responding to each other’s claims, that the state
and religious schools construct and perform identities
and authorities. Once discourses and rationales are
translated into concrete political actions, the process
is fractured and incoherent, rather than linear, fraught
with not only conflict and contestation but also coop-
tion and compromise.
Religious schools need to be problematized and rela-
tivized as such, because of their dual identities as faith
organizations and simultaneously educational estab-
lishments. Both are heavily contested loci of gover-
nance and have far-reaching implications for state–
society relations. The geographical literature on reli-
gious schools has generally been framed within the
relationships between faith and the state, and extant
analyses have adeptly analyzed how religious schools
are ideologically constructed as subjects of state inter-
ventions and expected to be better integrated to
national cultures, multiculturalism, civic participa-
tion, and broader communities (Dwyer and Meyer
1995; Hemming 2011a, 2011c; Dwyer and Parutis
2013). Although the studies have insightfully
unpacked that faith actors are not coopted by the state
but rework state discourses to reconcile religious
schooling with the state’s promotion of community
cohension, citizenship education, and multicultural-
ism, more refined understanding is needed with regard
to how faith-based ethos, sensibilities, and identities
motivate faith actors to contest state mantras. Impor-
tant insights can be drawn from the wider literatures
in the geography of religion and the geography of
education.
In the geography of religion, studies have
highlighted the state’s secular intervention as one pri-
mary focus of research. Impulses for secular reason in
the modern society, as Wilford (2010) contended,
entail that secular concerns of rationality, modernity,
and progress take precedence over and restrict
religious authorities in various areas of public debates
and policies, although it does not necessarily result in
the overall decline of religious beliefs. This notwith-
standing, many communities continue to organize cer-
tain aspects of collective social life on the basis of
religious conventions and norms, leading to a de facto
split of power between the state and religion (Arif
2008). The thesis of postsecularity, for example, makes
a strong claim for the robust presence and visibility of
religion in public life in late capitalist society
(Habermas 2002; Cloke and Beaumont 2012). As
Kong (2010) wrote, the intersection of the sacred and
the secular has been ongoing and abiding—the project
of purifying the public sphere by excluding religious
elements has never been complete and, in some con-
texts, not even a quest.
In this context, relationships between religious
organizations and the secular state are complex and
manifold, involving recognition and collaboration
and, at the same time, negotiation and even overt
contestation. One corpus of research that pertains
to this study is that on faith-based organizations
(FBOs). In Western societies, FBOs are now
increasingly hubs of social welfare and services (Ley
2008), which is, to an extent, comparable to the
provision of education by religious groups in Hong
Kong. FBO-provided service fills the gaps in social
welfare amidst the withdrawal of the state from cer-
tain public responsibilities. The state and faith
actors, on the one hand, seek to form relations of
“co-governance,” as faith bodies are included in
policy debates due to their important role in sup-
porting services and communities (Dinham and
Lowndes 2008; Beaumont and Cloke 2012). Activi-
ties conducted by FBOs are celebrated in policy dis-
courses as state–society partnership and community
empowerment (Chapman 2009; Kong and Woods
2016). On the other hand, however, discordances
between the state and FBOs are likely to emerge
from partnership. The state tends to follow an
instrumental, problem-solving orientation and treats
FBOs foremost as repositories of utilities and resour-
ces. In contrast, the aspirations and narratives of
faith actors that have no direct bearing on utilitar-
ian purposes could be rendered invisible in state
discourses (Dinham and Lowndes 2008; Williams,
Cloke, and Thomas 2012).
From the preceding discussion, one could reason-
ably maintain that religious organizations and groups
might be coopted by political rationalities endorsed by
the state. At least, religious organizations are willing
When Secular Universalism Meets Pluralism 5
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to enter into negotiations and demonstrate certain
flexibilities in theologies, orientations, and views
(Hackworth 2010; Bano 2011). This rapport cannot
be taken for granted, however, when faith-based ethics,
interests and agendas are in conflict with and prioritized
over rationalities of state governance. As Williams,
Cloke, and Thomas (2012) argued, religious groups are
empowered to “resist, revise, or modify government
rationalities and technologies” in explicit and articulate
ways (1486). The provision of social welfare by FBOs,
after all, is often underscored by the commitment to
deliver social justice and address social problems that the
state fails to fix (Beaumont 2008). In many cases, FBOs
carve out spaces of ethical identities and challenge rela-
tions and practices in secular economies and socialities
(Cloke and Beaumont 2012). With regard to neoliberal
agendas, FBOs comply in some circumstances but in
others transgress and subvert them. We return to this
point in the next subsection.
From a geography of education perspective, it has
long been argued that the spaces of education are con-
tested and politicized (Basu 2013). On the one hand,
as Mills and Kraftl (2016) argued, ethos and identities
of schools are by no means “free-floating from socio-
material and historical circumstances” (21). Academic
accounts of education policies need to consider the
ongoing evolution of state forms and practices, shaped
by transformations within and beyond a nation or
region (Lingard and Ozga 2006). As a quintessential
institution through which communities express, trans-
mit, and defend values and identities, schools are cen-
tral to many political contests and caught up in
ideological struggles that extend well beyond the
boundaries of schools (Collins and Coleman 2008).
One illustrative example is the struggle over the
implementation of National Standards in the United
States, which, as Merrett (1999) analyzed, was a war of
scale, as the state mandate to reform education in tan-
dem with market efficiency and competitiveness col-
lided with locally based control of value inculcation.
On the other hand, education is contested because it
is one of the primary loci in which subjectivity and citi-
zenry are produced (Boulton 2010; Basu 2013). In this
view, education policies are congregates of discourses
that take the appearance of “a fundamental, abiding
rationality, linked by nature to the just and the good”
(Foucault 1997, 62, cited in Christie 2006). As Mitchell
(2003) argued, “Educational systems were an integral
part of broader political struggles over the making and
remaking of state citizens and their social identities,”
and one ultimate objective is “the creation of a particular
kind of state subject” (390). In the United Kingdom, for
example, religious schools have been exhorted by the
state to place more emphasis on community cohesion
and citizenship education to ensure religious adherents’
loyalty to the British polity and common values and
instill a spirit of civic and political engagement (Flint
2007; Hemming 2011a, 2011b; Dwyer and Parutis 2013;
for a comparable case of Singapore, see Kong 2005).
Bring Neoliberalism into the Picture
As we have suggested, neoliberal transitions offer rich
opportunities for exploring the nexus of religion, educa-
tion, and state authority. In a broad context where neo-
liberal doctrines are often adopted as indisputable policy
rationales, education policies often consolidate neolib-
eral hegemony by means of reforming school curricu-
lums, training techniques, criteria of assessment, and so
on. As Mitchell (2003) argued, neoliberalism has eli-
cited a transition from the conception of education as
embodiment of humanistic values to the focus on ratio-
nalization, market effectiveness, and efficiency (Basu
2004), with localized meanings and selves “formed
through the economic system and organized through
performance as the central moral code within that sys-
tem” (Funnell 1995, 139). Schools are exhorted to nur-
ture students’ and staffs’ aspirations for progress, produce
capable subjects for economic goals, and meet the crite-
ria of a changing labor market (Klaf 2013; McCreary
2013; Finn 2016). Neoliberalization also reinforces a
culture of constant monitoring and assessment of the
performances in educational processes (Finn 2016).
Mitchell (2003, 2006) noted that in North America
and Europe, the focus on respect for plurality and dif-
ference in liberal education has been displaced by edu-
cational standardization motivating a strategic, mobile
cosmopolitan identity characterized by awareness of
global competitiveness and the economic purposes of
cultural capital. Neoliberal education policies apply
“golden rules” such as the prioritization of competition
and the retrenchment of state bureaucracy. As Klaf
and Kwan (2011) argued, these techniques of gover-
nance stitch together a “one-size-fits-all” straitjacket
that does not allow flexibility or diversity.
So far, geographers have not dedicated much work
to ask how neoliberalization of education acts as a cat-
alyst for alternative social formations, which might
relativize, destabilize, or even contest the hegemony of
neoliberalism in specific and uneven ways, if not tran-
scend them completely. Also, few studies, if any, have
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taken note of the ways in which neoliberalism affects
educational processes in faith-based schools. Yet,
faith-based motives could be translated into political
impulses that question and counteract neoliberal
restructuring of education, because FBOs have contra-
dictory relationships with neoliberalism.
On the one hand, FBOs have been criticized for being
coopted by neoliberal governanace, as they help perpetu-
ate the withdrawal of the state from sustained welfare
programs and are complicit in the moral interventions
into the lives of the poor (Cooper 2015). FBOs might be
actively involved in the promotion of an ethic of welfare
to work and emphasize individualized, desocialized
notions of responsibility (Hackworth 2010; Williams,
Cloke, and Thomas 2012). On the other hand, however,
FBOs are constituted by “theo-ethics,” and discourses
and technologies deployed in pursuit of grand-scale ratio-
nalities might “be subverted by the practice of particular
ethical precepts and affects” (Williams, Cloke, and
Thomas 2012, 1493; Williams 2015). The relationships
between neoliberal governance and faith-based social
formations are ambiguous and porous, and it is reason-
able to postulate religion acting as an axis of collective
agency against neoliberal techniques of governance
(Bolton 2015).
To sum up, the points of view that we have drawn
together enable us to conceptualize religious schools in
terms of the mutual constitution of state power, educa-
tional aspiration, and religiosity. This approach revisits
the embeddedness and volatility of faith-based education
(Dwyer and Parutis 2013) and is sensitive to the incom-
plete, selective ways in which neoliberalism is realized
and the many alternative logics played out locally (Ong
2007; Y. E. Cheng 2016). While the secular–religious
tension unfolds in Hong Kong, the state incorporates a
form of pastoral care to create market-sensitive subjects.
This study presents a situated analysis of the exchanges
between the state and religious groups in a concrete
space–time, taking into account how religious schools
constitute statecraft and reinvent themselves by actively
engaging with the rationalities of state governance.
Methods
The empirical analysis focuses on three areas of
inquiry. The first concerns the discourses and rational-
ities underpinning the Hong Kong government’s and
churches’ competing visions of SBM. The second con-
siders interactions and exchanges between the state
and churches before and after the Amendment was
passed, focusing on the assertions, negotiations, and
concessions that both parties had to make in a struggle
over decision-making processes. Finally, we reflect
briefly on the aftermath of the passing of SBM to
ascertain whether the churches’ worries were borne
out, while shedding light on the broader context of
the reconfiguration of state power.
The article bases its analysis on textual sources,
namely, Hong Kong–published newspaper articles
(published between 1 January 2002 and 31 December
2015), government documents and briefs, transcripts
of Legislative Council debates, three court rulings
based on a judicial review of the Amendment, and let-
ters and announcements published by Christian
groups. Newspaper articles form the primary source of
data. We collected Hong Kong–published Chinese-
and English-language newspaper reports on SBM,
totaling 318 in Chinese and 80 in English.
We choose to focus on secondary materials for two
reasons: First, data offered by these accounts are highly
nuanced, enabling us to paint a comprehensive picture
of the gradual unfolding of the controversy from multi-
ple positionalities; second, we have not collected pri-
mary data through interviews with protagonists,
because this article is largely a historical study of a
political struggle occurring a decade ago, and changed
sociopolitical milieus in Hong Kong might lead inter-
viewees to reinterpret the original controversy. The
pool of newspaper materials used in this research is
exhaustive of all media accounts on SBM. Among
them, approximately 50 percent contain specific infor-
mation on state rationalities, religious actors’ con-
cerns, and the discourses that both parties mobilize to
support their stances, whereas the rest contain only
factual information about the unfolding of the contro-
versy, verified against one another, and are therefore
of lesser importance to the analysis.
We acknowledge that published accounts are neces-
sarily partial, and although public statements from reli-
gious actors and the state are nuanced, both parties
selectively emphasized their concerns. For example,
whereas the churches focused on internal harmony
within religious schools and resistance against ideologi-
cal disruption, they might have chosen to conceal con-
cerns over the state’s likely intervention into the
schools’ finances, to avoid suspicion over abuse of fund-
ing or even corruption within religious organizations;
also, even if the state attempted to consolidate its con-
trol of faith groups by means of SBM, it would refrain
from stating so but emphasize civic participation and
accountability. These will be equally unlikely revelations
in interviews, however. Despite the partiality of public
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accounts, they offer relevant insights into how secular–
religious tensions were playing out in Hong Kong.
Tomake a finalmethodological note, most newspapers
in Hong Kong have political leanings, whether neutral,
progovernment, or prodemocratization (we specify the
political stances where we quote in the empirical sec-
tions). Our analyses use twomeans to deal with this issue.
First, we triangulate between different newspapers to
check on how events are reported (it turned out there
was a great deal of consistency across newspapers with dif-
ferent leanings). Second, we bear inmind how newspaper
articles might report from the positionalities of specific
actors; this was useful as it is precisely situated discourses
and claims that enabled political actions, andwe analyzed
the reports for the positionalities and corresponding
claims and actions.
Secular Universalism Meets Pluralism:
The Collision of Rationalities
SBM as Neoliberalization of Education
The promotion of SBM in Hong Kong took place in a
context wherein successive reforms in education—which
Y. C. Cheng (2009) described as a “reform syndrome”—
were designed. Rationales for these reforms have echoed
global neoliberal trends in education policies, with the
emphases on competitiveness in global economy, market
efficiency, and improved education quality (Mitchell
2003; Mitchell and Sparke 2016). A common character-
istic of the reforms is that they are top-town, based on
doctrines and principles alleged to be universally applica-
ble, regardless of the diversity of practices on the ground
and “structurally embedded conflicts of interests” (Choi
2005, 248). In particular, the notion of “stakeholder” has
been popularized: Education is viewed less as a holistic
process of value inculcation and more as a means to meet
the expectations of a diversity of stakeholders. Most of
the reforms were introduced after the 1997 Handover to
sustain the advantaged position of Hong Kong in the
global economy, of which SBMwas an integral element.
With regard to school management, the Hong Kong
government has adopted in general a devolution-cum-
accountability approach. Report No. 7 published by the
Education Commission, a semigovernment consultation
body, recommended that key players of education partici-
pate in developing school goals and quality indicators
(Education Commission 1997). The SBM scheme decen-
tralizes some decision-making power to schools, in terms
of education goals, personnel, and finance. It also makes
room for flexibility in the use of resources and formalizes
procedures for planning, conducting, and assessing school
activities (Lam 2006). Devolution, however, has entailed
the implementation of sophisticated mechanisms of eval-
uation and accountability, which, as Leung (2004) and
Pang (2008) commented, has led to the recentralization
of state power and created a culture of managerialism.
The Hong Kong state claims that SBM is under-
scored by the philosophies of participation, transpar-
ency, and accountability. A key report produced by an
advisory committee appointed by the Director of Edu-
cation, for example, promoted explicitly a vision of
“world-class schools” competing in “a global and knowl-
edge-based economy.” The report privileged “student
outcomes,” “a professional learning community,” and “a
strong alliance of stakeholders” as the overriding priori-
ties of school management (Advisory Committee on
School-Based Management 2000, 1–2).
To materialize these ideas, a series of changes to the
structure of school management have been prescribed
for aided schools to comply with. To begin with, the
SBM envisages a radically decentralized system of
school management. Whereas previously an SSB
might manage schools in a collective manner and use
one school management committee to run multiple
schools, the Amendment mandates that each school
should be run by a separate IMC to respond to the situ-
ated conditions and demands within the school.4
Accordingly, the Amendment clearly underscores
the notion of “stakeholders,” and it is prescribed that
at least 40 percent of the members sitting in an IMC
should consist of teachers, parents, alumni, and inde-
pendents, to represent a diversity of views on the mis-
sions and values of education from perspectives of
teaching activities, family needs, and the general soci-
ety’s expectations. Before the passing of the Amend-
ment, the state’s promotion of SBM through public
media relied heavily on the claim that SBM was con-
ducive to the democratization of school management
by inviting voices of stakeholders. Arthur Li, then Sec-
retary for Education and Manpower, suggested that the
composition of IMCs reflected principles of participa-
tion and transparency:
To introduce into the IMC the participation of teachers
and parents is a means to facilitate effective communica-
tions between sponsoring bodies, parents, teachers and
alumni, to improve the transparency of school manage-
ment and minimise the likelihood of lapses and prob-
lems. (“Let the Parents Contribute” [progovernment]
31 May 2004)
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Above all, as Peck and Tickell (2002) commented,
rationalization and standardization consolidate state
apparatus of control and authority. SBM fundamentally
enhances mechanisms of accountability to ensure the
“efficient” use of human and financial resources.
Although the amended Education Ordinance states that
the IMC is accountable to both the Education Bureau
and the SSB, in practice, a formalized channel of
accountability has been established only between the
school and the Permanent Secretary for Education.
Under the provisions of SBM, each IMC is required to
draft a constitution detailing the school’s vision and mis-
sion and submit it to the Permanent Secretary for
approval.
In advocating utility maximization, the state saw no
problem comparing schools to corporations. Fanny
Law, then Permanent Secretary for Education and
Manpower, commented, “Aided schools are funded by
the government, and like joint-stock companies; thus
the management has to be open and held accountable
to outsiders” (“Fanny Law” [neutral] 10 May 2004).
Overall, the state privileged SBM as a global best prac-
tice, which Hong Kong, as a cosmopolitan hub, must
embrace to stay in tune with the standards of progress
and modernity (“Accommodating Opposing SSBs”
30 April 2004; “The Diocese Failed” [neutral] 24
November 2006). Noticeably, there was a conception
of modern citizenry underpinning discourses about
SBM. Central to this construction of citizenry were
notions of active citizen participation, stakeholder
interests, and a polity accountable to a state regime
that actively intervened to create an environment of
competitiveness and efficiency (Peck 2001).
The Religious–Secular Collision
Aswementioned earlier, state–religion partnerships in
the provision of welfare and service might dispense with
faith-based identities, values, and sensibilities (Dinham
and Lowndes 2008). The vision of secular citizenry envis-
aged by SBM similarly does not take into account the
aspirations of religious schools to pass on faith-based iden-
tities and values. Ever since the draft of the Amendment
wasmade public inNovember 2002, the Catholic, Angli-
can, and Methodist churches, unified under the roar of
Cardinal Joseph Zen, the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Hong Kong, launched a concerted movement of resis-
tance to SBM, through both media outlets and legal
channels. Their unyielding stance eventually evolved
into a cornerstone event in the political landscape of
postcolonial Hong Kong. The churches’ overall argument
was that the state trumpeted a secular universalist ratio-
nality and risked obliterating pluralism in education.
SBM was also critiqued for impinging on free choice,
because students and parents should be entitled the right
to choose the context of socialization wherein to fulfil the
education mission (Legislative Council Debate 8 July
2004).5
Christian churches’ anxiety was, first of all, con-
cerned with the distribution of power in school man-
agement. They contended that the incorporation of
non-SSB elements in the IMC resulted in the weaken-
ing of power of SSBs. Relatedly, Christian churches
worried about the “fragmentation” of power, as under
the Amendment SSBs could no longer inculcate val-
ues to schools as a central authority but had to deal
with separate IMCs with different constitutions and
internal debates. In this sense, the state would margin-
alize SSBs by exercising a policy of “divide and rule”
(“Bishop Zen Appeals” 27 May 2004).
In the Legislative Council debates on the proposed
Amendment, some legislators resonated with the
churches’ position, contending that in contrast to the
self-declared advantages of participation and democra-
tization, the Amendment would initiate “a process of
centralisation of power of the education authority”
(Yiu-Chung Leung, legislator sympathetic with the
churches, Legislative Council Debate 8 July 2004).
Legislator Andrew Cheng resonated, suggesting that
the sentiment felt by churches emerged because
Under the new legislation, the incorporated manage-
ment committee (IMC) of each school will be account-
able to the Government, while the sponsoring body is
made a mere figurehead, the ideology of the sponsoring
body will then be swept under the carpet. . . . In particu-
lar, sizable SSBs such as the Catholic and Protestant
Churches will feel being split. (Legislative Council
Debate 8 July 2004)
Meanwhile, the Christian churches, especially the Cath-
olic Church, expressed unease with the prospect that
SBM would bring internal politics and antagonism, dis-
rupting harmony and consensus in management. In this
line of argument, religious bodies, different from secular
actors, prioritized unity and collectivism, whereas allow-
ing different stakeholders to represent their interests
would only instill the cultures of individualism and self-
centeredness (“ ‘Conspiracy’ to Deny” [neutral] 19
March 2002). In various media comments, the churches
reiterated that religious schools should not be turned
into battlegrounds, with ceaseless lobbying and politics:
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Under the new regime, the teachers, parents and alumni
on the IMC are chosen by election, and they may not
endorse the education ideals and principles of the
school-sponsoring bodies. . . . The result is, one teacher
or parent representative who is strongly opposed to the
education ideals and principles of the school sponsoring
bodies could turn the IMC upside down. (“Bishop Zen’s
Response” [neutral] 23 March 2004)
The churches’ main concerns were threefold. First, argu-
ing against the idea of principals and teachers sitting on
IMCs, Cardinal Zen wrote that it was unreasonable for
salaried personnel to supervise themselves. Second, in an
open letter to Catholic schools in Hong Kong (19 Sep-
tember 2000),6 Zen suspected that the illusion of trans-
parency created by stakeholder participation concealed
“hidden agendas,” insinuating likely liaisons between
“outsider” members and the state. Third, and more
important, Zen argued that one single member strongly
against the SSB would be enough to wreak havoc, caus-
ing insolvable division in the IMC, making the execu-
tion of the SSB’s vision and mission a challenge.
Based on these views, the churches called on state pol-
icies to be sensitive to religious views and rationalities.
For example, the churches insisted that in different con-
texts people needed to approach democracy in different
ways: Whereas the general society called for democracy
based on public discussion, active debate, and voting,
democracy in the schools must be balanced with the
necessity for minimal politicization, because good educa-
tion, especially a faith-based one, could only be carried
out in a peaceful and collaborative environment (e.g.,
“Bishop Zen’s Response” 23 March 2004). The stance of
faith communities followed the conviction that direct
state interventions would make it difficult for religious
schools to transmit faith-based visions and missions. Edu-
cation in Christian schools followed religious teachings
and encouraged students to lead a life inspired by reli-
gion. The churches’ fear of ideological disruption and
infiltration loomed large, given the potential disagree-
ment between the churches and outsiders and, worse,
the anti-Christian stance adopted by the Chinese central
state.
These views notwithstanding, the churches avoided
purporting to the public the image of hard-core reac-
tionaries hostile to politically correct lexicons of par-
ticipation, transparency, and democracy. As argued
before, religious schools are contingent and hybrid,
defying an either–or choice between the religious and
the secular. Comparable to madrasahs in Bano’s
(2011) study, the churches hoped to convey the
impression that they were flexible in their stance and
receptive to the democratization of school manage-
ment but simply wanted to approach it differently.
The churches repeatedly remarked to the media that
they welcomed wholeheartedly the basic spirit of SBM
but found problematic the ways in which it was
put into practice (e.g., open letter, Cardinal Zen,
Footnote 7; “Gloves are Off” 18 October 2003;
“Bishop Peter Kwong Accuses” 13 June 2004). Sup-
ported by the Anglican and Methodist churches, the
Catholic Diocese proposed a two-tier structure, in
which a school management committee (accountable
to the SSB) acted as the governing body of the school,
while seeking counsel from a second-tier school execu-
tive committee made up of teacher, parent, and
alumni representatives.
In response to the churches’ opposition, the
HKSAR government similarly charted a course
between critiquing the “particularism” of religious
schools and reaffirming the respect for plurality. On
the one hand, progovernment comments occasionally
portrayed the Christian churches as “trapped in out-
dated mindset” and resistant to progress (“The Diocese
Should Progress” 4 February 2010). On the other
hand, the state insisted that SBM by no means aimed
at political assimilation, because members appointed
by SSBs, who accounted for up to 60 percent, ensured
that religious visions and values could be effectively
transmitted. Precisely because the state could not sim-
ply dismiss as irrelevant the claims of faith communi-
ties, the legislation of SBM underwent protracted
negotiations and compromises, as we analyze in the
next section.
Struggling over the Political Decision-
Making Process
In the case of religious schools under state interven-
tion, friction between abstract logics of utility and effi-
ciency and situated needs and concerns of faith actors
induces much uncertainty amidst a byzantine process
of coevolution and coconstitution (Mitchell and
Sparke 2016). In the case of SBM, the controversy was
shaped by the highly divided nature of politics in post-
1997 Hong Kong. The struggles extended beyond the
boundaries of schools and became enmeshed in cam-
paigns for fuller democratization and liberalization
under Chinese sovereignty. In this context, the Chris-
tian churches were allied with prodemocracy parties
and legislators to counter the power bloc of progovern-
ment politicians.
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Between 2002 and the passing of the Amendment
in 2004, the state, the Christian churches, and prode-
mocracy legislators engaged in prolonged debates to
negotiate the terms of the bill. The Amendment actu-
ally offered Christian schools an option to bypass the
compulsory requirement of establishing IMCs, if the
registration of the schools were to be changed to the
Direct Subsidy Scheme (DSS); that is, to become
partly subsidized private schools. Under DSS, schools
would receive less funding from the state and have to
considerably increase tuition fees, which was at odds
with the philanthropic philosophy of the churches.
Akin to state–religion partnerships in a neoliberal
context (Dinham and Lowndes 2008), the HKSAR
government prioritized the definition of religious
groups as a resource to be drawn on to help in the pro-
vision of social (in this case educational) service,
rather than as a community group with its own mission
and ethos, betraying uneven relations of power in local
state–religion relationships. Although state officials
kept praising Christian groups for contributing to a
vibrant and diverse education sector, they also insisted
that it was unlikely to exempt religious schools from
SBM, as the law was supposed to be universally applied
(“Michael Suen” 26 April 2008). The churches had no
option other than to negotiate within the parameters
set by the overarching ideologies of SBM.
In the Legislative Council, the pro-Beijing Demo-
cratic Alliance (DAB) and Liberal Party stood in sup-
port of the government. Even the prodemocracy
Democratic Party found it difficult to resist the seduc-
tive vocabularies of participation, transparency, and
accountability and did not adopt an unequivocally
oppositional stance to the bill. A newspaper article in
Ming Pao suggested that the rhetoric of democratic
school management was hegemonized to such an
extent that the prodemocracy camp found themselves
in a “dilemmatic situation” (“Cheung Man-Kwong
Suggests” 14 March 2004). Nonetheless, led by Legis-
lator Cheung Man-Kwong, the Democratic Party
made a number of efforts in the hope that government
power could be properly harnessed and checked. In
response to accusations of abuse of power and conflict
of interests in school management, the EMB made a
number of compromises. Among others, the revisions
to the draft Amendment gave SSBs more power to
intervene in financial matters of schools; SSBs were
given the right to nominate candidates for principals;
moreover, the minimum numbers of teacher and par-
ent members in an IMC were reset to one, instead of
two as in the original draft.
Another issue that fueled heated debate concerned
the power of the Permanent Secretary. Cheung Man-
Kwong, for example, criticized the Amendment for
running the risk of rubber-stamping the state’s abuse
of power (“Implementation Date” 17 June 2004).
Polemics concentrated on four capacities specified by
the draft Amendment for the Permanent Secretary,
namely, the rights to dissolve IMCs; to appoint an
unlimited number of members to an IMC and revoke
the registration of any member not deemed “proper
and fit”; to approve and revise the constitution of an
IMC; and, finally, to close down a school refusing to
set up an IMC. In response to the concerns, EMB
agreed to delete provisions authorizing the Permanent
Secretary to close down schools and dissolve IMCs.
Yet, with regard to the approval of constitutions and
appointment or removal of IMC members, Permanent
Secretary Fanny Law insisted that the government
needed to retain the power to monitor schools, claim-
ing, though, that the discharging of this power would
be subject to maximal constraints and that a channel
of appeal would also be put in place.
Last but not least, prodemocracy legislators strove
to implement a mechanism to assess the effects of the
new law, should it be finally passed. Initially, Cheung
Man-Kwong proposed to postpone the legislation of
the Amendment for three or five years, during which
period the schools might practice IMC on an
“experimental” basis. The HKSAR government ada-
mantly rejected this proposal, on the basis that the
state could not surrender the power to enforce SBM.
Eventually, the EMB and Cheung Man-Kwong
reached consensus on a plan, which envisaged the leg-
islation of the Amendment in 2004 but a policy review
in 2008. Ironically, the 2008 policy review exposed
once again the ability of neoliberal rationalities to dis-
cipline and unify opinions. A report summarizing find-
ings of the review, which was commissioned to Policy
21 Ltd, the University of Hong Kong largely repeated
the hegemonic rhetorics of active citizenship, trans-
parency, and effectiveness, asserting that “the great
majority of stakeholders of IMC schools did not con-
sider that the relationship between their schools and
SSB deteriorated and their schools had deviated from
the original mission of SSB in running the schools”
(Policy 21 Limited, 2009).
On 8 July 2004, the Education (Amendment) Ordi-
nance finally passed the Legislative Council, with a
vote of twenty-nine to twenty-one. The Democratic
Party opted to oppose the bill, at the urging of the pro-
democracy camp and Christian churches. Christian
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groups generally held the view that the revisions made
to the draft Amendment were too moderate and failed
to substantially challenge a centralized regime of
power. Endorsed by the Anglican and Methodist
churches, the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong took a
radical step and brought the HKSAR government to
court. In 2005, 2009, and 2010, the Diocese filed three
successive writs for judicial review. The overall reason-
ing of the Diocese was that the SBM scheme violated
Articles 136, 137, and 141 of the Basic Law of
HKSAR, given that these articles allowed religious
organizations to “continue to provide religious educa-
tion” (Article 137) and run schools “according to their
previous practice” (Article 141). In the church’s view,
SBM clearly impaired the “previous practice” of Chris-
tian schools, limiting their autonomy and affordance
in providing faith-based education.
All three cases were turned down by the court. Nev-
ertheless, the bases of the judges’ rulings provided a
valuable window into the uneasy relationship between
secular universalism and cultural pluralism. The spe-
cific ways in which the judiciary in Hong Kong
approached the relationships between the state, reli-
gion, and education exemplified the ambiguities and
complexities of state rationales and the positions of
faith actors. First, the role of religious institutions in
the socialization and cultivation of citizens was recog-
nized and respected in overt terms. Second, however,
it was also agreed that religious institutions were not
asocial but must be subject to secular interests and
concerns, related to the ongoing development of a
social totality. Hence, finally, education provided by
religious institutions was viewed as embedded in, not
separate from, changing ideologies and norms of the
broader society, which echoed our argument that reli-
gious schools are not external to, but inside, the ongo-
ing construction and performance of secular interests.
In the ruling by the Court of First Instance on 23
November 2006, the judge wrote that continuity with
previous practice meant that religious organizations
could run schools and teach courses in religion as they
did before 1 July 1997 but did not entail that religious
schools had a right of veto on any change in the edu-
cation system (Court of First Instance 2006, HCAL
157/2005). If the argument of the Diocese was deemed
valid, the ruling continued, then “more than half of
the aided schools in Hong Kong are, in effect, immune
from whatever educational policies that Government
of the Hong Kong SAR may formulate” (Para. 144).
The judge went on to argue that the autonomy of reli-
gious schools was by no means absolute, but subject to
government policies: “The privilege of autonomy car-
ries with it the requirement of accountability” (Para.
247), because aided schools received huge funding
from the state.
The Catholic Diocese appealed the judgment. On 3
February 2010, the Court of Appeal ruled, again in
favor of the government. The judge endorsed the pre-
vious interpretation on the continuity with previous
practice by arguing that “the theme of continuity
envisaged by the Basic Law is not a prescription for
ossification” (Court of Appeal 2010, CACV 18/2007).
The ruling thus emphasized that what the Basic Law
envisaged was that the systems and policies practiced
in Mainland China would not be introduced to Hong
Kong, but there was a necessary implication in the
Basic Law for ongoing development and improvement
of systems in the region. Finally, the Court concurred
that there should be a balance between religious
autonomy and “greater transparency of management,
more efficient management, and enhanced account-
ability to the public purse” (Para. 68), while adding
that the IMC, composed of SSB, teacher, parent,
alumni, and independent representatives, should not
be ruled out as a vehicle by which autonomy could be
exercised.
Unwavering even after two successive losses, the
Diocese brought the case to the Court of Final Appeal.
Writing in their judgment on 13 October 2011, two
judges presiding over the case decided that it was not a
constitutional right protected by the Basic Law for the
SSB to exert 100 percent control over schools. While
resonating with arguments in previous rulings, how-
ever, the judges held that Article 141 of the Basic Law
should not be interpreted just in terms of the right to
continue to run schools but from a perspective of reli-
gious freedom (Court of Final Appeal 2011, FACV
No. 1 of 2011). For the judges, the question at stake
was whether SBM violated religious freedom. Citing
as evidence the facts that the amended ordinance
stated explicitly that SSBs had the right to set the
vision and mission of schools and that the policy did
not impede religious worshipping or praying in
schools, the court reached the conclusion that SBM
had not led to the erosion of religious freedom.
Epilogue: The Neoliberal Phantom of State
Power?
The ruling of the Court of Final Appeal did not give
closure to the politics of SBM. The Christian
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churches, unsurprisingly, expressed profound disap-
pointment over the rulings and declared that they
would never give up on ideological unity in schools. In
the face of profound conviction on the part of the
Christian churches, the question lingers as to what has
transpired since the courts dismissed the appeal of the
Diocese. This section briefly discusses the develop-
ments in Hong Kong’s school management in the
aftermath of the passing of the Amendment, which
projects back to the question of whether the churches’
anxieties over SBM were warranted. Our role, how-
ever, is not to present a singular, normative answer to
this question, which is ultimately ideological, after all.
Since the 2011 ruling, there has been no room for
Christian schools to continue to dodge the establish-
ment of IMCs, but hitherto there has been no media
spotlight on churches whose religious mission and val-
ues were subverted. The absence of public records cap-
turing the churches’ complaints of ideological
infiltration or IMC members propagandizing against
religious values appears to suggest a lack of solid evi-
dence that “outsider” members readily act as agents of
state secularism. We reach this conclusion for three
reasons: First, given the manner in which the churches
harnessed public discourse in the earlier phase to resist
the Amendment, ideological infiltration appears to be
such a sensitive issue that it overrides other concerns
such as the need to maintain a public image of organi-
zational unity; second, Hong Kong has a strong sector
of neutral and prodemocracy media, which do not
withdraw vis-a-vis state authority even under Chinese
rule. Finally, in the 2012 controversy over the Moral
and National Education, there was no evidence that
IMCs could easily be exploited by the state to sway
the opinions of schools.
Yet, it is equally hasty to dismiss the concerns of
churches as unfounded and invalid. On the one hand,
at this moment, it is perhaps too early to be conclusive,
as schools run by the three churches started to establish
IMCs only in 2011. On the other hand, the past
decade has indeed witnessed the centralization and
consolidation of state power in terms of the control
over education in Hong Kong, through a neoliberally
inspired system of accountability and evaluation.
Despite the gesture of devolution, the most decisive
powers have been centralized to the state, which has
led to the restriction, rather than relaxation, of grass-
roots decision making. Three issues put the spotlight
on how centralized power of the state has been pro-
duced and how this has yielded deleterious effects.
Media accounts suggested that all state-funded schools
were subject to these new initiatives, although not
specifying whether religious and secular schools were
evenly affected. Nonetheless, these neoliberal impulses
shed important lights on religious schools at the edge
of secular social formations, both within and beyond
the context of this study.
The first issue was the widespread complaint among
teachers about the dramatic increase in workloads, not
only because the government had raised the bar on
teaching standards and education quality but also
because under SBM, teachers needed to deal with a
huge amount of paperwork to frame grounded experi-
ences of teaching into a system of preformulated qual-
ity indicators. Instead of answering to a diversity of
student needs, teachers had to answer foremost to a
management leviathan driven by market-based logics.
The second issue concerned the policy of
“optimizing” school and class sizes. As the number of
school-age children shrank rapidly due to low fertility
rates, numerous schools in Hong Kong could no longer
recruit enough students. It was suggested by the public
that classes might be downsized to increase education
quality and hence school survival. Yet, the state
decided to close down schools with low recruitments
(“killing schools,” in local parlance), insisting that
classes could not be downsized, for the sake of efficient
use of resources. Although many IMCs appealed that
problems of recruitment and class size should be left to
schools, the authority emphasized that they had the
final say in education policies, raising suspicion over
the genuine willingness of the state to devolve power
and promote democratic decision making (e.g., “The
Professionals” 13 December 2008).
A third debate focused on the policy of enforcing
compulsory criteria on schools using English as the
medium of instruction (MOI). In 1997, the HKSAR
government implemented a program to encourage
schools to use Cantonese as the MOI, in the belief
that learning with one’s mother language was condu-
cive to education quality. Only a small number of
schools meeting specific criteria were allowed to use
English as the MOI. This invited criticisms over the
creation of a divide between English MOI schools as
more respectable and prestigious and Cantonese MOI
ones as inferior (e.g., “Cheng Yin Cheong” 22 Febru-
ary 2005). After the passing of the Amendment, it has
been expected that the decision of MOI would be
handed to IMCs, but the state has yet to make a con-
cession in this regard.
In sum, the Christian churches’ opposition to IMCs
was one specific manifestation of a general perception
When Secular Universalism Meets Pluralism 13
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of the expansion of state power amidst Hong Kong’s
neoliberal transition. The transfer of power from SSBs
to the state was symptomatic of a larger tension at play
in Hong Kong society, anchored in neoliberal impera-
tives and secular universalism. It was complicated by
factors such as faith actors’ claim to alternative man-
agement culture and the suspected ideological
encroachment of the local and Chinese central state.
Conclusion
Geographical analyses of religious schools have
demonstrated that state discourses are not applied in
educational contexts in coherent and unilinear ways.
Instead, various actors appropriate and rework state
discourses, presenting ideological and cultural ideas
that are hybrid and ambivalent, rather than clear-cut
(Hemming 2011a; Dwyer and Parutis 2013). Yet this
line of research has generally not focused on religious
schools as a locus of overt contestation and struggle for
power, as has been the case of SBM in HKSAR. In
this sense, this case allows us to develop broader argu-
ments in the geographies of religion and education
and to delineate new theoretical contours sensitive to
localized struggles. Neoliberalism, in this study, is seen
as an important context for secular–relgious tension to
unfold. When we tease out the logics behind the poli-
tics of SBM, it is clear that state secular intervention
comprised both the use of discursive power and a
mechanism of actions grounded in neoliberal logics of
good governance. The state used education reform as a
technology to instill a conception of citizenry, not by
directly indoctrinating students but by mongering a
new vision of state–society partnership through the
appointment of IMC members.
Empirical evidence of this case allows us to draw a
few insights to advance a theorization of the politics of
religious schools. First, in insisting on SBM, the Hong
Kong state prioritized “common values” over sectoral
religious ones but could not simply dismiss religious
concerns. It thus had to make gestures of compromise
and concession. Therefore, the state’s ability to stamp
its authority was not total, even with the seemingly
indisputable arguments about democratic participation
and transparency.
Second, when faith actors in Hong Kong were
engaged in the provision of social services—in this
case, education—the ways in which they maneuvered
between religious and secular interests were charac-
terized by both flexible accommodation and overt
resistance. Working “inside” the state by being a
recipient of state funding did not entail that faith
actors would dispense with the values and goals out-
lined in their organizations’ missions and become
“docile subjects co-opted under institutional pressures
of their funders” (Williams, Cloke, and Thomas
2012, 1488). Resistance, however, had to be balanced
with flexible accommodation of competing claims, in
this case, in the form of the churches’ willingness to
institute alternative mechanisms of participation and
accountability.
Finally, in negotiating state–religion relations, key
actors are embroiled in contexts not necessarily cen-
tral to religious matters. This explains why the recog-
nition for religious schools and pluralism is neither
complete nor absolute but always subject to the inter-
vention of context-specific secular rationalities. The
controversy in Hong Kong was certainly related to a
struggle about faith in the public sphere and reverber-
ated with Dwyer and Parutis’s (2013) work about how
religious schools were a key site of struggle, but in this
instance, the context of debate and negotiation sug-
gested that far larger stakes were at play. The circum-
stances were framed by a larger quest by different
actors to transit from government to governance,
where citizens and groups were seeking to put their
stakes in the ground in relation to market-based rea-
son. Neoliberal impulses, however, were enmeshed in
issues of democratic struggle in Hong Kong and the
unspoken fear of “infiltration” of pro-Beijing ele-
ments. Although the contestation over the manage-
ment of religious schools was grounded in a question
of religious authority over faith-based schools, it was
closely framed by concerns over diversity, religious
rights, religious freedom, and democratic citizenship.
To conclude, we suggest that, beyond the scope of
this article, the study of religious schools can benefit
by the approach of bringing together the outward-
looking and inward-looking perspectives, as advocated
in the literatures on the geographies of education
(Bradford 1990, in Kong 2013; Thiem 2008). The for-
mer is a macro political economy (Holloway, Brown,
and Pimlott-Wilson 2011) approach that has tradi-
tionally examined educational provision and what it
tells us about wider social, economic, and political pro-
cesses. The latter is a micro social–cultural (Holloway
et al., 2011) approach that emphasizes actual educa-
tion processes, social difference within school spaces,
and the importance of the voices of children and
young people in understanding educational experien-
ces. Throughout the article, we have argued, on the
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one hand, that religious schools are coconstituted by
faith-based ethos and secular discourses and, on the
other hand, that neoliberalism offers a highly revelant
context for theorizing religious schools as hybrid and
contingent. This coconstitution unfolds not only at
the level of religious–state relations, though, but also
mundane practices of teaching and learning and the
formal and informal networks, collaborations and
exchanges between clergy, managers, teachers, and
students. This article has not ventured to incorporate
an inward-looking, microlevel direction, but the
potential remains for examining the ways in which
state rationalities could be reworked and resisted
through lived practices, in the religiously coded affec-
tive environment of the campus.
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Notes
1. The EMB was renamed the Education Bureau of
HKSAR in 2007.
2. In this article, the notion of the state refers to the local
state of HKSAR; where necessary, reference to the Chi-
nese central state is specified.
3. In 2010, the Hong Kong government proposed the addi-
tion of a Moral and National Education program to pri-
mary and secondary school curricula. The program
propagated allegiance to the Chinese state and embrace
of Chinese national identity. It aroused an outcry of
opposition, on the ground that pro-Beijing indoctrina-
tion would impair prodemocracy and profreedom spirits
in Hong Kong. In 2012, the Hong Kong Government
suspended implementation of the program indefinitely.
4. For the full text of the Amendment, see Education
(Amendment) Ordnance (2004).
5. See Legislative Council of Hong Kong SAR (2004).
6. See Zen (2000).
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